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Introduction
‘I have come to the conclusion that if a vote were to take place today,
the outcome would not be positive for the European institutions or for
the European project. In these circumstances I have decided not to
submit a new Commission for your approval today. I need more time
to look at this issue, to consult with the Council and to consult further
with you, so that we can have strong support for the new Commis-
sion. . . . These last few days have demonstrated that the European
Union is a strong political construction and that this Parliament,
elected by popular vote across all our member states, has a vital role to
play in the governance of Europe.’ Jose´ Manuel Dura˜o Barroso, Commission
President designate
‘Today this House on the river Rhine has grown in stature. Its will was
tested, its will has prevailed. . . . Mr Barroso, you suggested yesterday
that it was anti-European to vote against your Commission. . . . [but]
today, Euroscepticism loses because the voice of democracy in Europe
has risen by an octave and has made itself heard in every national
capital and beyond.’ Graham Watson, Leader of the Alliance of Liberals and
Democrats for Europe (the liberal party in the European Parliament)
On 27 October 2004 the European Parliament refused to elect the
new Commission, the European Union (EU) executive. There was no
vote, as 10 minutes before the vote the Commission President designate,
Jose´ Manuel Dura˜o Barroso, announced that he was withdrawing his
team of Commissioners. He simply did not have the numbers: the Party
of European Socialists, the second largest party in the Parliament after
the June 2004 elections, was backed in its opposition to the proposed
Commission by the smaller liberal, green, and radical-left parties.
This coalition, with a combined force of 371 out of the 732 Members of
the European Parliament (MEPs), was easily larger than the pro-
Commission bloc of the European People’s Party (EPP), with 268 seats,
and the small conservative national party to its right, with 27 seats.
If it was so clear that the Parliament would reject the Commission,
why did Barroso not withdraw his team earlier? It had been known for
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some time that many liberal, socialist and green MEPs were unhappy
with the nomination for the justice and home affairs portfolio of
Rocco Buttiglione, a devout Catholic with ultra-conservative views on
immigration, women’s rights and homosexuality.
Barroso and the governments thought that they could railroad the
Parliament. The governments expected the Parliament to support
a Commission that was composed of politicians nominated by the
twenty-five governments of the EU member states, as it had always done
before. The Parliament does not have the right to reject individual
Commissioners, but only to reject the whole team, and rejecting the
whole team was thought of as the ‘nuclear option’. Moreover, a cross-
party coalition in the Parliament had voted for Barroso in July, and
the proposed Commission contained a reasonable balance of con-
servatives, social democrats and liberals. Above all, Barroso did not
place Buttiglione in another portfolio or force the Italian government to
nominate someone else, because the governments were convinced that
they could force ‘their’ MEPs to support the Commission.
This time, however, the European Parliament did not bend to the will
of the governments. Only the night before the vote did it become clear
that the overwhelming majority of MEPs would side with the leaders of
their supranational parties in the Parliament rather than with their
national party leaders, who were lobbying them heavily to support the
Commission. It was now too late to reshuffle the team. Barroso hence
decided that delaying the vote was the only option.
The media heralded this climb down by Barroso and the governments
as a founding moment for democracy at the European level.1 A coalition
of supranational political parties was able to rally their troops in the
Parliament to block the will of the supposedly sovereign governments of
twenty-five nation-states. With cohesive parties that are independent
from national government pressures, the formal powers of the European
Parliament, to amend legislation and the budget and to elect and cen-
sure the Commission, were now a reality. Democratic politics had finally
arrived in the EU.
Most commentators failed to realise, however, that parties and politics
inside the European Parliament had been developing for some time.
1 For example, Wolfgang Munchau in The Financial Times declared that it was ‘a great day
for European democracy’ (28 October 2004, p. 17). Adrian Hamilton in The Independent
wrote: ‘Europe’s leaders . . . cannot just continue taking the Union’s institutions or its
voters for granted . . . But the other great lesson of this week may well prove more
beneficent in the long term . . . we are seeing in [the European Parliament’s]
manoeuvrings the beginnings of cross-national parties and Europe-wide politics’ (28
October 2004, p. 41).
Democratic politics in the European Parliament2
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Since the first direct elections in 1979, beyond the attention of the mass
media and the voters, and even off the radar screens of most of the EU’s
governments, the MEPs had gradually fashioned a well organised and
highly competitive party system at the European level. What actually
happened in October 2004 was that Europe’s political class was finally
forced to wake up to the new reality, where supranational party politics
is a key aspect of policy-making in the emerging European polity.
What we do in this book is explain how this process developed: why
MEPs chose to organise as supranational parties in the European Par-
liament in the first place, why these parties then evolved as powerful
agenda-setting actors, why voting along supranational party lines gra-
dually replaced voting along national party lines as the dominant form of
behaviour in the Parliament, and ultimately how democratic politics
emerged in the only directly elected institution at the European level.
We argue that increases in the power of the European Parliament have
played a crucial role in shaping supranational parties in the European
Parliament.2 In a rather short space of time, a matter of decades rather
than centuries, the European Parliament has evolved from an unelected
consultative body to one of the most powerful elected assemblies in the
world. Today, a large proportion of social and economic legislation
applied in the member states of the EU is adopted at the European
rather than the national level. The European Parliament not only has
the power to amend and reject most EU laws but also influences the
make-up and political direction of the body that initiates these laws: the
European Commission. We argue that this increase in powers has made
the European Parliament look increasingly like a normal parliament with
cohesive parties who compete to dominate legislative outcomes and who
form coalitions with other party groups for that purpose.
Summary of the argument and the main findings
We analyse all of the nearly 15,000 recorded votes by individual MEPs
(roll-call votes) in the first five elected European Parliaments, covering
the 25-year period between 1979 and 2004. We show that voting in the
European Parliament has become increasingly structured. Contrary to a
widespread popular perception, this structure is based around the
transnational European parties, and not nationality. A German con-
servative is more likely to vote with a Portuguese conservative than with
2 For a survey of the explanations for the development of the powers of the European
Parliament, see, in particular, Rittberger (2005).
Introduction 3
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a German social democrat or a German green. The voting behaviour of
MEPs is thus based on party rather than nationality.
We build a theory to explain why this is the case in the European
Parliament and also in other democracies. Our argument is based on the
idea that in a democracy political conflicts (over redistribution, legisla-
tion, and so on) inside a parliament between representatives of different
territorial units are best solved by federalism; in other words, by the
appropriate devolution of power to the territorial units themselves, when
these conflicts are important. The costs of devolution can then be
minimised by keeping some powers centralised, such as jurisdiction over
free trade and other areas (some key environmental competences, for
example) where externalities between territorial units are important and
would have a negative effect under decentralisation. We argue that it is
more difficult and less efficient to organise the devolution of powers to
socio-professional groups or economic sectors, or other functional
interests in the economy, because this would entail potentially very
negative economic consequences. If conflicts between territorial units
can be solved more easily by devolution of powers than conflicts
between socio-economic groups, then it follows quite naturally that the
conflicts one ends up observing in national parliaments or federal leg-
islatures are conflicts between socio-economic groups. This explains
why parties form along the left–right axis and not along territorial lines.
The theory applies to other advanced democracies as well as to the
European Parliament.
We show that party cohesion has increased as the powers of the
European Parliament have steadily increased. This suggests that higher
stakes in decision-making have given MEPs with similar policy pre-
ferences the right incentives to solve their collective action problems
inside the parliament, to form European-wide parties, to delegate
increasing powers to the leaders of these organisations, to come up with
unified positions to compete with the other European parties and to
discipline their members into voting with the European party line. We
show, for example, that cohesiveness of parties does not decrease in the
long run even when the parties become more ideologically hetero-
geneous. However, higher fragmentation of the European parties is
associated with a somewhat lower cohesion. In other words, when the
European parties are composed mostly of many small national party
delegations, they have a harder time to agree on a common position
than when the European parties are composed of some large national
delegations and some smaller ones.
The cohesion of European parties is quite surprising for several rea-
sons. First, the degree of agenda control by the European party leaders
Democratic politics in the European Parliament4
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is more limited than in most national parliaments. Indeed, the European
Commission has the exclusive right of initiative of nearly all EU legis-
lation. Hence, legislation that comes on the floor of the European
Parliament emanates from outside the parliament and not from a
majority coalition inside the parliament. This inability to control the
agenda should reduce party cohesion, as the leaders of the parties in the
parliament cannot filter out proposals on which their members have
divergent political opinions. We do find some evidence of lower cohe-
sion due to the lack of agenda control – for example, the parties are
slightly more cohesive on non-legislative issues, which are initiated
internally in the parliament, than on legislative issues, which are initi-
ated externally. However, we also find evidence suggesting that the
European parties are able to overcome the lack of agenda control and
vote cohesively. For example, we find that a European party is as
cohesive in a vote on a ‘hostile amendment’ (where an amendment is
proposed by another party on a bill where a member of the first party is
the rapporteur) as in all other votes.
A second reason why cohesiveness should be lower in the European
Parliament is that European parties do not have many instruments to
discipline their members. They do not control the selection of candidates
in European Parliament elections, as this is controlled by the national
parties who make up the European parties. The European parties also
have no control over the future career of MEPs, as it is again the national
parties who control the allocation of ministerial portfolios and other jobs
in the domestic arena and the selection of European Commissioners. The
only instruments European parties have to discipline their members are
the allocation of membership of legislative committees, rapporteurships
and other positions of influence within the European Parliament. These
instruments are relatively weak in terms of their disciplining power. They
are definitely weaker than the ones available to parties in parliamentary
regimes. However, to the extent that it is national parties that develop
common positions in their European parties, it is national parties that play
a key role in enforcing European party discipline. Individual MEPs nearly
always vote with their national party delegation, independently of their
own preferences. If one adds this to the fact that it is rare that a national
party votes against its European party, one understands that national
parties play a key role in determining the cohesion of the European
parties. European parties are able to mobilise their members to participate
more in votes that are expected to be closer and the outcome more
competitive.
We consequently argue that the incentive to form and maintain
powerful transnational party organisations is fundamentally related to
Introduction 5
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 09:43:30 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491955.001
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
political competition inside the European Parliament to secure policy
outcomes from the EU that are as close as possible to the ideological
(left–right) preferences of the MEPs and national parties. It pays to be
cohesive because this increases a party’s chance of being on the winning
side of a vote and thus to influence its final outcome. It is thus natural
that the increases in the powers of the European Parliament have led to
a stronger and more democratic structure of politics in the European
Parliament, based around left–right competition between genuine
European parties.
Outline of the book
Chapter 1 provides some essential background material on the devel-
opment of the powers of and parties in the European Parliament.
Chapters 2 and 3 then present the two basic elements of our theory: that
political parties are essential for the functioning of democratic politics,
and that these political organisations are more likely to emerge around
ideological (left–right) divisions than territorial divisions.
The remainder of the book contains a series of empirical tests of our
ideas, using a unique dataset of all roll-call votes in the European Par-
liament between 1979 and 2004. Chapter 4 starts the analysis by
looking at the increasing participation of MEPs in roll-call votes and
how participation varies with the powers of the European Parliament on
the issue of the vote. We find growing levels of participation, more
growth in more organised parties, and more participation where the
Parliament has more power.
The next three chapters focus on partisan politics inside the Parlia-
ment. Chapter 5 looks at the ‘cohesion’ of the political parties. We
introduce a cohesion index for measuring the cohesion of parties and
national delegations. We show that while voting along transnational
party lines has increased, voting along national lines has decreased. We
then investigate the determinants of party cohesion, and find that the
transnational parties are increasingly cohesive despite growing internal
ideological and national diversity.
We then investigate two possible explanations of growing partisan
politics in the European Parliament. Chapter 6 focuses on whether the
parties in the European Parliament can enforce party discipline by con-
trolling the agenda. We find that parties are more likely to be cohesive
where they have some control over the agenda, on non-legislative
resolutions, for example. Because agenda-setting rights are shared
amongst the parties and because legislation is initiated externally by the
Commission, this limited agenda control in the European Parliament
Democratic politics in the European Parliament6
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 09:43:30 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491955.001
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
should lead to a lower cohesion than what we observe. We also show
that parties are not less cohesive when facing hostile amendments on
bills they sponsor. There is thus strong suggestive evidence that Euro-
pean political groups are able to discipline the voting behaviour of their
members even when they do not control the agenda.
Chapter 7 focuses on whether national parties or the European
political groups have more control on the MEPs. We find that MEPs are
less likely to vote against their national parties than their European
political groups. On balance, one-third of an MEP’s voting behaviour is
determined by his or her European political group and two-thirds is
determined by his or her national party. Hence, growing transnational
party politics in the European Parliament must be explained via national
political parties. Despite continued policy differences between the
member parties in each European political group, national parties have
decided to form increasingly powerful transnational political parties and
to endow these organisations with leadership and agenda-setting
powers.
The next two chapters then look at the ideological structure of politics
in the European Parliament, within and between the European parties.
Chapter 8 focuses on coalition formation between the European parties.
We look at the proportion of times the majority in each political group
voted the same way as a majority in another political group. We
show that coalitions in the European Parliament are increasingly along
left–right lines. We also investigate the determinants of coalition for-
mation, and find that the left–right ideological distance between any two
political groups is the strongest predictor of whether they vote together
in a given period and over time.
Chapter 9 then looks at the dimensions of voting in the Parliament.
We apply a scaling method to the roll-call votes and find that the classic
left–right conflict is the main dimension of voting in the European
Parliament, between as well as inside the European parties. In other
words, the further an MEP is from the average left–right preferences of
his or her European party, the more likely he or she will vote differently
from the other members of the party. We also find that, although less
salient, the second dimension captures MEPs’ preferences on European
integration as well as conflicts between the parties in the European
Parliament and the parties represented in the Council and Commission.
The next two chapters supplement the aggregate analyses in the
previous empirical chapters with two detailed case studies. Chapter 10
investigates the parliament’s executive-control powers, by analysing
MEP behaviour in four key votes in the fourth parliament (1994–1999)
on the investiture and censure of the Santer Commission. We find the
Introduction 7
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emergenc e of ‘governme nt-oppo sition’ politic s in the Europe an Parli a-
ment: wh ere the Europe an parties who dominat e the Comm ission te nd
to support the Com mission, while the p arties wh o are either no t
represent ed in the Commi ssion or who are marg inalised in this insti-
tution tend to opp ose the Commi ssion. From this pers pective, at the
start of the Bar roso Com mission in 2005, there was ‘unified govern-
ment’ in the EU, where a centre-ri ght coalition cont rolled the Com-
mission, the Europe an Pa rliament , and the Coun cil.
Chapt er 11 turns to the parliame nt’s legis lative powe rs, by investi-
gating ME P behaviou r in the fifth parliame nt (19 99–200 4) on the
Takeove r Directiv e. We find that eve n when the politic al stakes are
extremel y high, Europe an parties and left–ri ght prefere nces have a sig-
nificant influen ce on MEP behaviou r. Whe re an iss ue is highl y salient
for a p articular m ember stat e in a vote, the MEPs from this state m ay
vote together an d against their Euro pean par ties. However, because this
only affec ts one or two member states in any vot e (as was the case with
German MEPs on the Takeove r Dir ective), and beca use this only
occurs in a small numbe r of votes on an y bill, Euro pean par ties’ posi-
tions and left–ri ght preferenc es of MEPs are the main deter minants of
legislati ve outc omes in the Europe an Parliame nt.
Fi nally, Chapt er 12 conclu des by drawing ou t the implic ations of our
argume nt an d findings as well as discu ssing avenues for futu re res earch.
Les sons for political science an d Eur opean politi cs
The researc h pres ented in this book contains ins ights both for politica l
science in general an d for the sub-fi eld of E uropean polit ics. We spell
them out brie fly here but will come back to these issues through out the
book.
From the point of view of political science, our book contributes to
the study of legislative behaviour in a comparative perspective. A first
important question refers to the role of parties in democracies. Why do
we generally observe party formation in democracies? Along what lines
do they form? What is the effect of party systems in legislative decision-
making? In Chapter 2, we provide a synthesis of these questions and
provide a systematic analysis of the advantages of strong party systems in
democracies relative to weak and fragmented party systems. We dis-
tinguish between the role of parties in solving collective action problems
external and internal to the elected legislature. Collective action problems
external to the legislature refer to electoral politics. Parties play a crucial
role in mobilising the electorate to vote, a key question in political science.
They also provide brand names with well-known and recognisable
Democratic politics in the European Parliament8
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platforms and a reputation that has value with voters and is therefore
valuable to preserve, which enhances the reliability of politicians. Col-
lective action problems internal to the legislature refer to legislative
politics. Cohesive parties reduce the volatility and increase the pre-
dictability of legislative decisions. They allow for specialisation of par-
liamentarians in specific issues, which improves the quality of bills. They
increase the efficiency of policy-making by screening out inefficient
programmes that only bring benefits to small groups and costs to the
general public. They also reduce the dimensionality of politics by
creating correlations between the different dimensions of politics.
We contribute to the theory of parties by proposing a theory, briefly
summarised above, for why parties in stable democracies form mainly
along the left–right axis and not along territorial lines. Our theory is a
complement to the ‘cleavage theory’ of Lipset and Rokkan. The clea-
vage theory does not ask why parties do not generally form on a terri-
torial basis, except in countries where the borders and the territorial
organisation of the state remain contested. In the context of the Euro-
pean Parliament, it is especially important to ask that question. On the
other hand, the cleavage theory gives content to our notion that parties
form on a functional and not on a territorial basis.
Political scientists have made much progress in recent years in trying
to understand what causes voting behaviour inside elected legislatures.
The European Parliament is an especially interesting institution to verify
political science theories. With members from multiple nation-states,
who are organised into national as well as transnational political parties,
and with dramatic changes in the powers of the institution, the Eur-
opean Parliament is a unique laboratory for testing general theories of
political parties and legislative behaviour. Most political science theories
of parties and legislative politics have been developed in very particular
institutional contexts, such as the US Congress or the British House of
Commons. If these theories are truly generalisable, however, they
should also hold in the European Parliament. Different theories high-
light different causes of party cohesion. Many traditional theories
emphasise the ‘carrots and sticks’ used by party leadership to discipline
their representatives to toe the party line. One alternative theory, asso-
ciated mostly with Keith Krehbiel, emphasises the preferences of the
members of a party. Cohesion in voting is related to closeness in political
and ideological preferences. Politicians sort themselves into parties on
the basis of their preferences, and it is this sorting that fundamentally
creates cohesion. Another theory, put forward in a recent book by Gary
Cox and Mathew McCubbins, emphasises the role of agenda control in
explaining party cohesion. Parties use their control over the legislative
Introduction 9
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agenda to only put forward bills on which there is strong support from
their party in the parliament.
In this book, we find that ideology alone cannot explain party cohe-
sion. While European parties tend to form coalitions on the basis of
ideological closeness, variation in cohesion within the European parties
is not related to variation in ideological preferences in the European
parties. Similarly, compared with other legislatures, European parties
have relatively little control over the agenda. Nevertheless, cohesion is
relatively strong. Overall, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that
the European parties are able to discipline their representatives in the
European Parliament. However, our findings suggest that this happens
mostly via the influence of national parties, which voluntarily choose to
form European parties to promote their own policy goals, and then act
collectively to secure these goals.
From the point of view of European politics, our work builds on the
research of scholars in this field in the last decade. Scholars not only
have been closely observing the functioning of the European Parliament,
but have also collected samples of voting data to try to understand better
the patterns of voting behaviour. By putting together and making
available the complete population of roll-call data in the history of the
European Parliament, we hope to contribute to bringing the level of
research on the European Parliament to the level of existing research in
American politics, where roll-call data from the whole history of the US
Congress are used in a standard way to analyse issues of American
politics.
Our research shows that the European Parliament cannot be under-
stood as a unitary actor engaged in strategic games with the Commission
and the Council. It shows how and why cohesion of the European
parties has changed over time. It shows that left–right politics is the main
dimension of contestation in the European Parliament, but a second
dimension has also emerged, which relates to the speed and nature of
European integration and battles between the European Parliament and
the Council and Commission.
More broadly, the European Parliament is fundamentally important
for the future of the EU and democratic governance in Europe. The EU
was probably the most significant institutional innovation in the orga-
nisation of politics and the state anywhere in the world in the second half
of the twentieth century. At the beginning of the twenty-first century,
however, there is growing concern about how viable this organisation is
in the long term if it cannot be made more democratically accountable.
The European Parliament is uniquely placed, as the only directly elected
institution at the European level, to operate as the voice of the people in
Democratic politics in the European Parliament10
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the EU governance system. If democratic politics does not exist in the
European Parliament, then the future of the EU may be bleak. How-
ever, if democratic politics has begun to emerge inside the European
Parliament, in terms of being based around political parties that
articulate the classic ideological divisions of democratic politics, then
perhaps democracy beyond the nation-state is possible after all.
This is all the more important in the light of the constitutional fiasco
triggered by the failed referendums on the European Constitution
project in France and the Netherlands. Opposing arguments have been
voiced that the Constitution went too far or not far enough in the
European integration process. It is doubtful, however, that a new con-
stitutional project would gain more support within the European
population if it does not strengthen the democratic accountability of
European institutions. The European Parliament is the only directly
elected body in the EU. While being often criticised or vilified by some
national politicians and national media, one should not forget that it is
also the European institution that is most trusted by European citizens.
In the Eurobarometer opinion poll survey in the Autumn of 2004, 57 per
cent of respondents in the 25 EU member states said that they trusted
the European Parliament, while only 52 per cent said that they trusted the
European Commission, and 45 per cent said that they trusted the
European Council – which is composed of the heads of government of
member states. One can argue that these figures are relatively low, but our
research shows that there are good reasons for citizens to trust the
European Parliament! The European Parliament is a real parliament,
with real parties and real democratic politics.
Introduction 11
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